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INTRODUCTION 
In recent weeks, the Article 50 negotiations on 
the UK’s departure from the EU have entered the 
proverbial rapids. On 14 November, UK Prime 
Minister Theresa May and EU Chief Negotiator 
Michel Barnier presented a draft withdrawal 
agreement and outlined the political declaration 
setting out the framework for the future UK-EU 
relationship. At a special European Council on 25 
November, the Heads of State and Government 
endorsed both documents. In London, Theresa 
May faced a number of cabinet resignations and 
heavy criticism. Yet before the withdrawal 
agreement can have binding effect, the approval 
of the House of Commons as well as from the 
European Parliament is required. Similarly, the 
future relationship still needs to be negotiated in 
detail. This leaves policy-circles in all EU capitals 
pondering three critical questions: what to make 
of the proposed agreement, which future 
scenarios are possible from this point, and in 
what ways can negative outcomes be mitigated? 
From a Belgian perspective, the withdrawal 
agreement and the accompanying political 
declaration deserve to be welcomed. While the 
prospect of Brexit is not in the national interest, 
the Article 50 negotiations offer a reasonable way 
forward in order to avoid worst-case outcomes. 
Fundamentally, the withdrawal agreement 
respects the democratic choice of the British 
people to leave EU, whilst safeguarding the rights 
of EU citizens and the financial interests of the 
EU-27. Also, the transition that the withdrawal 
agreement provides for, in combination with the 
political declaration aiming for “a trading 
relationship on goods that is as close as possible” 
(§20), goes a long way in protecting the deep 
commercial ties that exist between Belgium and 
the UK.1 Last but not least, both documents help 
What are we to make of the Withdrawal 
Agreement and the Political Declaration 
outlining the future relationship between the 
EU and the UK? This European Policy Brief 
explores the current state of the Brexit debate 
from a Belgian perspective. While the Brexit 
deal deserves to be welcomed, domestic 
politics continue to act as a bottleneck. 
Whether or not the Withdrawal Agreement 
obtains parliamentary approval, Belgian 
authorities would do well to stay alert and 
prepare for multiple potential outcomes. 
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preserve the integrity of the single market and the 
EU’s political architecture while leaving open 
different avenues for maintaining a close 
economic and security partnership with the UK 
that is devoid of political integration. Some 
caution is nonetheless in order. What has been 
agreed has not yet received parliamentary 
consent. Important questions with respect to the 
future relationship remain. Recent developments 
thus constitute a transitory step rather than a 
definite outcome. 
This European Policy Brief explores the current 
state of the Brexit debate from a Belgian 
perspective. The first section explores in what 
ways the arena of domestic politics continues to 
be the bottleneck through which Brexit must 
necessarily unfold. The second section outlines 
different scenarios in function of the question 
whether parliamentary consent can be obtained. 
The third and final section distills a number of 
policy implications for Belgium. These 
encompass not only the need for preparedness 
for multiple outcomes at the national level, but 
also the relationship between Belgian authorities 
and the wider European framework. 
DOMESTIC POLITICS AS THE BREXIT 
BOTTLENECK 
In keeping with earlier Egmont analysis, it is the 
domestic political context on both sides of the 
English Channel that explains the slow pace of 
Brexit negotiations earlier.2 While the sui generis 
nature of the EU translates into a painstaking 
coordination process amongst the European 
Commission and the member states, with the 
resulting limits in terms of political flexibility, the 
fraught situation of UK domestic politics has 
been the most responsible for the absence of 
more substantial progress to date. After all, it was 
only at the Chequers meeting in July 2018 that the 
UK government confronted the inevitable trade-
offs that leaving the EU would entail.3 As the 
negotiations now approach their second major 
moment of truth, both parties are coping with 
political headwinds that limit their freedom of 
action. 
On the UK side, the issue of parliamentary 
approval represents the make-or-brake issue for 
the proposed Brexit agreement. The government 
led by Theresa May has now survived two 
successive waves of resignations by leading 
Brexiteers (most notably David Davis and Boris 
Johnson in July, then Dominic Raab and Esther 
McVey in November). As Brexiteers and 
Remainers find themselves united in opposition 
to the withdrawal agreement – albeit for different 
reasons – it has become most uncertain whether 
the weakened May government can muster 
sufficient support in Westminster to get the deal 
approved, that is to say at least 320 MPs. Theresa 
May confronts both hardline Brexiteers and 
committed Remainers within the ranks of her 
own party, and cannot necessarily rely on much 
support from the opposition benches.4 
Before exhorting the British to get on with Brexit, 
the EU-27 would do well to look in the mirror. 
The much-vaunted unity amongst the EU-27 is 
on full display when defending the acquis, but 
when it comes to imagining the future of the 
European project, the consensus quickly 
disappears, as for example the debate on the 
banking union can attest. Paradoxically, this lack 
of consensus amongst the EU-27 about their 
common future breeds a degree of intransigence 
in dealing with the UK. While the political 
declaration on the future relationship displays 
some conceptual similarities with the UK White 
Paper set forth in July 2018 (most notably in the 
area of Justice and Home Affairs) the EU 
negotiators have been reluctant to give much 
ground. This hard-nosed approach may also 
relate to the time pressure exercised by the March 
2019 deadline, which plays to the bargaining 
advantage of the EU. At the heart of the Brexit 
talks exists a tension between desire for change 
and defence of the status quo. Seen in this light, 
pressing the EU’s negotiating advantage to the 
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maximum carries a significant risk of souring the 
future relationship. 
These domestic political difficulties are unlikely 
to go away. Even if Theresa May’s government 
manages to garner sufficient parliamentary 
support, the negotiations on the future 
relationship will continue to be bedeviled by 
similar dynamics. Both the UK and the EU are 
struggling to maintain their internal cohesion and 
to meet the various demands of their own 
citizens. Taking into account that the essential 
interests of the EU with respect to financial 
matters and the rights of citizens have been 
protected, considerable forbearance towards 
Brexit is required in order to safeguard the 
attraction of the European project. 
TO RATIFY OR NOT TO RATIFY, THAT IS 
THE QUESTION 
With the deadline of 29 March 2019 looming, 
much attention has gone to the notion of 
preparing for different future outcomes.5 With 
the withdrawal agreement being concluded, this 
debate has acquired greater clarity and urgency. 
Future scenarios can be organized into two broad 
categories, depending on whether the agreed 
documents survive ratification in the House of 
Commons and in the European Parliament. In 
both cases, however, important questions on the 
future relationship remain to be addressed later 
on. Preparing for Brexit must therefore proceed 
from a position of prudence, that is aiming for a 
UK-EU relationship that is as close as possible, 
while not discounting the risk of political 
disruption leading to a ‘no deal’ outcome. The 
latter is also reflected in the so-called 
Contingency Action Plan drawn up by the 
European Commission.6 
In the scenarios in which the withdrawal 
agreement manages to obtain sufficient 
parliamentary support in London and Strasbourg 
to obtain legal effect, ratification will not 
represent the end of the road. It will mean that 
the transition arrangement can go into effect on 
30 March 2019. This will provide for considerable 
continuity in the economic relationship until the 
end of 2020 and perhaps beyond. This would 
avert major economic disruption while the future 
relationship is being negotiated. It also postpones 
the hard trade-offs the UK faces in choosing 
between market access and regulatory autonomy. 
The economic partnership referred to in the 
political declaration foresees a free trade area as 
well as wider sectoral cooperation, yet this is 
premised on the existence of “distinct legal 
orders” which are to be “managed through 
customs procedures and checks” (§ 21). The 
exact mandate for negotiating the future 
economic partnership would constitute the next 
decisive point: these directives would need to be 
adopted by the end of March 2019. 
In those scenarios in which the proposed 
withdrawal agreement gets rejected by the House 
of Commons (or by the European Parliament, 
although a more remote possibility), the 
existential choice is back in the UK’s camp: to 
continue with Brexit without a withdrawal 
agreement providing for an orderly process, or to 
buy time for alternative outcomes. Given that the 
‘no deal’ option would result in severe political 
and economic disruption, the most obvious way 
of avoiding the cliff-edge would be to extend the 
Article 50 negotiations on a basis of a unanimous 
decision by the UK and the EU-27. Presumably 
this can only be done with a good reason, such as 
another referendum or an alternative form of 
Brexit, such as EEA membership.7 From a 
Belgian perspective the desire to avoid a 
disorderly Brexit is paramount.8 Should the 
withdrawal agreement fail to be ratified, the 
option of extending Article 50 should therefore 
be embraced as an emergency measure. 
As dissimilar as they are in their instantaneous 
result, all the above scenarios share the important 
feature of leaving open the long-term 
characteristics of the UK-EU relationship. In the 
political declaration, the EU has made the depth 
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of the future relationship conditional on UK 
choices that are yet to be made. As such, the 
withdrawal agreement minimizes economic 
disruption in the short term, but leaves the 
fundamental characteristics of the future 
relationship unaddressed. This makes prudent 
planning for future scenarios all the more 
reasonable. To this purpose, various Belgian 
federal and regional authorities have already 
launched various measures to mitigate the 
negative fallout and exploit new opportunities, 
such as the ‘Brexit Impact Scan’ led by the federal 
Ministry of Economy or the ‘Brexit Actionplan’ 
adopted by the Flemish Government.9 What 
remains to be done? 
FOUR IMPLICATIONS FOR BELGIUM 
Firstly, a state of alert continues to be required. 
Today, a palpable sense of Brexit fatigue is setting 
in. As Belgium is gearing up for elections in the 
spring of 2019, political attention risks being 
scattered. Yet given the Article 50 negotiations 
are approaching their point of culmination, this is 
not the time to be distracted. All member states 
will seek to get their interests reflected in the 
forthcoming negotiation directives for the 
economic partnership: this is the critical time for 
exercising influence. Also, if the withdrawal 
agreement fails to obtain parliamentary backing, 
more turbulent European Council deliberations 
can be expected. This provides a reminder that 
Belgium can ill-afford a prolonged period under 
a caretaker government. 
Secondly, the future evolution of UK-EU 
custom arrangements constitutes a particular 
point of attention. Whether a new customs 
regime phases in on 1 January 2021 (at the end of 
the agreed transition), or already in 2019 (in the 
case of ‘no deal’), or at a later date to be defined, 
the reality is that even if a free trade regime for 
goods can be negotiated, the customs regime will 
be in flux. As the political declaration states in § 
28, “the extent of the United Kingdom’s 
commitments on customs and regulatory 
cooperation, including with regard to alignment 
of rules, would be taken into account in the 
application of related checks and controls. (…) 
This (…) can lead to a spectrum of different outcomes 
for administrative processes as well as checks and controls” 
(emphasis added). For Belgium as a logistic hub 
with deep commercial ties to the UK, this 
remains a critical issue. A first response concerns 
the recruitment and training of 141 additional 
custom officials, yet it is doubtful whether this 
will suffice.10 
Thirdly, it remains urgent to diversify foreign 
trade relationships with a view to nurturing 
Belgian economic prosperity beyond Brexit. 
Even the best EU-UK free trade deal will not 
substitute for the mutual economic benefits of 
full membership. Belgium must also brace for 
potential regulatory hurdles to Belgo-British 
trade to emerge, most notably in the area of 
services. The best answer to this challenge is to 
pursue to the maximum the benefits and 
opportunities presented by the trade agreements 
the EU has already concluded with the wider 
world, such as with the Republic of Korea, 
Canada, or soon with Japan. 
Fourthly, the Belgian position in the EU 
warrants monitoring. Looking back to the point 
at which preparations for Brexit began, Brexit has 
become a good example of how the combined 
muscle of Belgian federal and regional authorities 
can be pulled together when facing an imminent 
threat to the common interest of all Belgian 
citizens. At the same time, concern has grown 
that the budgetary and institutional neglect of 
foreign policy has resulted in a progressive loss of 
Belgian influence in the EU and the wider 
world.11 The most recent Belgian foreign policy 
statement unsurprisingly labeled Brexit the first 
priority of its EU policy.12 Yet it also notes that 
the Belgian diplomatic corps faces major staffing 
challenges and continues to shrink in size. It is 
hard to see how Belgium’s international 
ambitions can be upheld without sustained 
investment and leadership focus. 
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